INTRODUCTION

DATELINE NEW YORK -THOUSANDS OF U.S. CITIZENS DIED TODAY AS
I saw several dozen people on the platform who had either collapsed or were on their knees unable to stand up. . . One man was thrashing around on the floor like a fish out of water.
Those who could walk staggered up three flights of stairs to the clean fresh air. Some vomited, others lay rigid. 1 People who had moved more slowly, spent more time near the spilled liquid, were retching blood and half blind. We must continue to reduce the threat posed by existing arsenals of such weaponry as well as work to stop the proliferation of advanced technologies that place these destructive capabilities in the hands of parties hostile to U.S. and global security interests. Nearly a decade after the end of the cold war, some 30,000 nuclear warheads are still available for use around the world, each with devastating destructive power.
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Security lapses at some federal labs and plants that house nuclear weapons have left them increasingly vulnerable to theft and sabotage...
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There are heightened concerns about Russia's nuclear weapons security program.
Former Russian general Alexander Lebed, Russia's former security chief..., announced in early September that perhaps 100 suitcase-sized nuclear bombs were unaccounted for....On Oct.6, Yeltsin signed a law classifying all information relating to military bases, nuclear weapons or radioactive material -renewing speculation about Lebed's assertions.
Additionally, former "Soviet scientists, accustomed to a certain lifestyle and government support, now find themselves fortunate to be employed". So, since the availability is widespread, who are the potential players in the contest for acquiring and potentially using weapons of mass destruction?
The abyss is there but who wants to make it bigger and more threatening?
There are two broad categories of actors: nation states and others. In the past, nation states were the predominant threat. They remain a viable concern due to existing Hence, it appears time we switch our prevailing concern to the A other' potential actors in this equation. These include transnational elements such as terrorist groups, religious cults, ethnic sects, and criminal organizations.
These asymmetric threats differ significantly from nationstates. There are no territorial boundaries and they offer no clearly defined target for retaliation. Their goals and desires are often ill-defined or irrational. They lack structure and mechanism for established diplomatic relations and they lack any clearly defined decision making protocols. Secondly, the concern over government and public reaction (backlash) has eroded. Thirdly, the utility and success of conventional tactics has diminished.
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The number and type of recent incidents support Mr.
Campbell's argument. The realities are frightening.
More than three dozen incidents on U.S. soil... are under active investigation by the FBI's antiterrorism unit. That's double the number from the previous year.
In Oregon, investigators now believe an outbreak of salmonella food poisoning in Portland salad bars that made more than 700 ill and hospitalized dozens was the work of a religious cult hoping to sabotage voter turnout on Election Day.
Other incidents include radioactive material in toothpaste (Long Island, New York), and mail-order vials of bubonic plague (Ohio) .
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The issue then, becomes how to deal effectively with the WMD threat in the hands of these non-state actors. If the prospects of attaining diplomatic solutions are dismal, then we must be prepared to respond.
Back to the abyss. You now know it is there. Worse than you ever imagined and there are people out there who would-love to see you fall in. In fact, if they could, they would rush to be the one pushing you over the edge.
NATIONAL POLICY
What is the U.S. policy dealing with this issue? If national policy is "a broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives" 19 , then current U.S.
policy dealing with this issue is found in multiple documents.
To keep things in perspective, national strategy (the ends, ways, and means of implementing policy) and its subset military strategy evolve from national policy. This national policy should support our national interests and values and be based on some strategic vision that depicts the desired endstate of our nation and our world at some futuristic time. This vision acts as the foundation for the creation of policy and subsequently strategy.
Although it is difficult to clearly identify the Vision' for our nation from current administration documents, a recent National Defense Panel report outlines several possibilities. These include the possible worlds described as Shaped Stability, Extrapolation of Today, 20 Competition for Leadership, and Chronic Crisis. All four possible future worlds reflect a significant WMD threat.
To a large extent, the basis for today's policy is found in several National Security Decision Directives A National Security Strategy for a New Century has numerous passages that provide insight to our current policy. Presidential Decision Directive (PDD)-39 provides additional specifics while capturing the essence of the policy: w it is the policy of the United States to use all appropriate means to deter, defeat and respond to all terrorist attacks on our territory and resources, both people and facilities, wherever they occur."
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If this is indeed our policy, are we appropriately implementing it and is it effective? On one hand, an evaluation indicates it is working since the experiences with WMD incidents on U.S. soil are minimal. On the other, it appears to be failing since the potential threat of an
incident occurring has increased. One obvious metric is to examine the resources (ways and means) made available to counter the threat under the umbrella of the current policy.
In effect, is our National Strategy (the ways and means of implementing policy) working?
You have decided as a matter of policy that you cannot ignore the abyss. You realize it is there and want very much to do all that you can to avoid the dreadful journey into the hole.
NATIONAL STRATEGY
The United States' overarching security plan is summarized in a document referred to as the National -no single agency has the authority and the expertise to unilaterally handle the many difficult issues -the consequences of a WMD incident would almost immediately overwhelm local, state, and federal capabilities -enforcement of various perimeters by different authorities may impede response -responders cannot be required to put their own lives at risk in order to enter a contaminated perimeter (hence it is possible the area will be closed until contaminants have degraded to safe levels) 31 These assumptions are significant! In essence, they state the consequences may far exceed our abilities to mitigate. Even more importantly, they indicate that those upon whom we rely for help may withhold their assistance. 
The headquarters must be well trained in Crisis Action
Planning and be capable of immediately responding to the threat. The HQ's ability to rapidly identify all critical tasks, assign these to component forces, and synchronize their immediate execution is critical to a successful response.
After establishing the requisite 'headquarters' structure, significant thought must be given on how to focus its energies. To do so effectively, the commander must focus on both the friendly and enemy 'centers of gravity'.
In The advantages of a Standing JTF HQ are numerous.
Since it has been in existence for a period of time, its strengths and weaknesses are normally well known. It is easy to ensure the staff is properly manned (all service elements and technical skills adequately represented).
Assigned personnel have worked together, know each other, and know the standard operating procedures of the unit.
They have also had the opportunity to train together.
Assuming the JTF HQ is focused on a particular type of mission (in this case Consequence Management), key personnel and critical points of contact (POCs-listings and numbers)
should be readily available. Additionally, a series of planning and execution exercises would probably have been conducted to educate the staff on the types of problems and solutions they may encounter. The disadvantages all relate to cost. It is expensive to maintain any standing force. 35 The primary advantage of an Ad Hoc JTF HQ is cost savings in that day-to-day expenditures associated with personnel, facilities or equipment comprise normal unit expenses. The disadvantages are significant.
There is no continuity within the organization: the people do not know each other, there are no standardized operating procedures, and they must create and learn these things while simultaneously handling the crisis; there are few, if any, training opportunities to prepare for a crisis.. These staff members have already worked together, they have vital knowledge of and contacts within the CINC staff, and they understand joint because they work in that 38 environment on a daily basis.
The problems with the plug are longevity and loyalty. They may only remain for an initial jump start and it is difficult to break with their previous identities associated with the higher headquarters.
To further complicate matters, most JTFs deal with warrelated circumstances and have been (relatively speaking) somewhat shielded from the day-to-day intricacies of the interagency process. This has recently changed.
As joint military exercises and real world operations become further intertwined with federal agencies, more attention to planning and anticipation of preparatory requirements will be 39 required.
The unique aspects of the interagency process require the joint task force (JTF) headquarters to be especially flexible, responsive, and cognizant of the capabilities of not only the JTF's components, but other agencies as well.
A brief review of the Joint Center for Lessons Learned
Bulletins indicate "coordination is a key to any successful mission but it is even more applicable to interagency . There was a lack of understanding of how the civil relief agencies operated. This caused confusion on how to interface with FEMA, the Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and the local governments. These agencies also had difficulty interfacing with our operations. Liaison teams helped however, prior training would have cured many of the problems.
-Training required for personnel assigned to positions as Commander or on the staff/staff element of a JTF must, for the most part, take place prior to stand-up of the JTF. This pertains particularly to individual skills necessary to perform effectively in these positions. Additional knowledge and skills pertinent to cross-functional and cross-Service tasks (or potentially multilateral tasks) and to a specific mission that must be performed in a joint context will need to be frequently trained once the JTF is formed... In particular, the level of JTF staff training was found to directly influence the success of the joint task force staff. Focusing training conducted for the JTF staff as an entity on critical essential collective tasks is crucial for making effective use of the very limited time available to the JTF once it is stood-up.
-Overall, lack of familiarity or experience with joint doctrinal concepts appeared to be the root cause of many of the problems identified. 
SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The threat is real and it is unlike anything we have faced in our past. In Secretary Cohen's words, "We face a clear and present danger today." The abyss is there, as big as it could be, and there are unknown forces with a desire to push you into the hole.
Upon review of the current policies and strategies, current U.S. policy appears viable for the near term future.
Its only apparent weakness lies in its failure to openly address how we should deal with other nation states.
Clearly, we must involve them in the fight. We must emphatically persuade them to adopt vigorous policies to reduce the threat within their sphere of influence. 
